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A B S T R A C T
This multi-method study aims to shed light on digital platforms' decisions regarding their openness. Platform
openness results from a series of decisions on how open a platform is regarding: (a) suppliers, (b) customers, (c)
complementary service providers, as well as to (d) product categories and (e) channels. By conducting a scoping
literature review, we analyze the current body of knowledge about the drivers, dimensions and outcomes of
platform openness. Using an expert panel discussion and analysis of real-world digital platforms, we confront
this existing knowledge with current business challenges to identify research challenges. We address how future
research can advance platform research by tackling these challenges.
1. Introduction
Two-sided or multi-sided platforms open up their business to ex-
ternal users, like suppliers and customers, to enable mutually beneficial
transactions between them. Platforms provide an infrastructure that
facilitates these interactions with the aim to create value to their dis-
tinct users, while appropriating value for themselves (Maffè & Ruffoni,
2009). The advent of digital communication technologies has allowed
platforms to facilitate nearly frictionless user participation and trans-
actions, and capitalize on growing user bases via reinforcing network
effects (Eisenmann, Parker, & Van Alstyne, 2006).
Extant research identified the challenges and tradeoffs that platforms
face during implementation (Cennamo & Santalo, 2013, 2015), and in
particular, with regard to dealing with various degrees of platform openness
(Hagiu & Wright, 2018; Parker & Van Alstyne, 2017; Thomas, Autio, &
Gann, 2014). Van Alstyne, Parker, and Choudary (2016a: p. 1) argue that
platforms often fail because they do not optimize “openness”: “If platforms
are too closed, keeping potentially desirable participants out, network effects stall;
if they're too open, there can be other value-destroying effects, such as poor
quality contributions or misbehavior of some participants that causes others to
defect.” Although openness increases platforms' market potential (Ondrus,
Gannamaneni, & Lyytinen, 2015) as a greater number of users extend
platforms' functionality via increased network effects and innovation po-
tential (Binken & Stremersch, 2009; Claussen, Essling, & Kretschmer, 2015;
Gawer, 2014), one of the key challenges of this increased openness is the
need to maintain control over all parties involved (Boudreau, 2010;
Cennamo, 2018).
While previous research takes an actor-based approach providing useful
insights on the openness toward suppliers, customers, and complementary
service providers (Hagiu & Wright, 2018; Thomas et al., 2014; Van Alstyne
et al., 2016a, 2016b), it ignores other openness decisions, such as the in-
clusion of product categories and channels that constitute an essential part
of the firm's value creation, and that determine the platform's attractiveness
in the eyes of its dominant users: suppliers and customers. Including these
two openness dimensions enriches our understanding of how changes to
these five openness dimensions (and their interplay) create value to multiple
parties.1 Hence, we define platform openness2 broadly as the platform's
openness toward granting access and authority to suppliers, customers, and
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complementary service providers, and toward the inclusion of categories
and channels.
Openness is important to platform success as it determines how well
platforms can leverage their external users' resources to match their
internal capabilities (Thomas et al., 2014). Assessing how to optimize
openness is, however, a challenging task due to user tradeoffs, inter-
dependencies, and dynamic effects that make it more difficult to predict
and manage the evolution of a platform (Gawer & Cusumano, 2008;
Thomas et al., 2014).
We still know little about what drives openness, and the mechan-
isms through which openness impacts value creation and appropriation.
The first aim of this paper is to identify the dimensions of platform
openness, and place the concept in a larger nomological network. The
second aim is to identify managerially relevant research challenges that
help to guide future research to address the issues managers face re-
garding openness. To attain these goals, we link the theoretical findings
(based on a scoping literature review) to the practical business chal-
lenges (based on a panel discussion with industry experts, and an
analysis of existing real-world platforms). Our study offers three dis-
tinct contributions. First, we treat platform openness in a more com-
prehensive and integrative way by including product categories and
channels as important nonactor-based openness dimensions, and depict
platforms as shaping their own openness signature configured out of
five openness dimensions. This approach helps to consider openness in
the light of important business model decisions regarding the inclusion
of channels and products.
Second, we embed the concept of platform signature in a larger
research framework by identifying its drivers and outcomes based on a
scoping literature review. This framework enables scholars and prac-
titioners to assess what may drive platform openness, as well as predict
the mechanisms of how a change in a platform's openness may create or
destroy value for its users.
Third, by identifying the business challenges related to managing
platform openness, we contribute to a better understanding of its
complexity in practice. By eliciting the origins of its complexity (in-
terdependencies, dynamic nature), we determine what scholarly
knowledge is needed to help managers to make more informed deci-
sions. Based on these managerially relevant issues, we identify research
challenges that help to advance platform research.
The paper is structured as follows: we conceptualize digital platform
openness in Section 2, followed by a discussion of our methodology in
Section 3. In Section 4, we show the results from our scoping literature
review to identify what we know about the drivers and outcomes of
platform openness. In Section 5, we confront the extant academic
knowledge with practice to see what “real-world” challenges remain
unresolved. In Section 6, we provide recommendations about how
platform research can tackle prevalent research challenges. Section 7
concludes.
2. Conceptualizing digital platform openness
2.1. Digital platforms
Platforms can be investigated at the organizational, product family,
market intermediary, and platform ecosystem level (Thomas et al.,
2014). This study focuses on the market intermediary level in which
platforms act as an intermediary between two or more market partici-
pants, and facilitate exchange activities through an intermediating
technology like they do in online auctions, price comparison sites,
search engines, credit cards, and online retail platforms.3 We focus on
transaction-based platforms in which products are exchanged among a
network of equivalently positioned economic actors4 (cf. Perren &
Kozinets, 2018). Digital platforms provide a common set of design rules
and a digital infrastructure to facilitate exchanges between multiple
users, who might otherwise never have the opportunity to interact with
each other (Ondrus et al., 2015). The platform's fine design and struc-
ture of variable and fixed charges determine the willingness of its users
to join a platform, as well as the net surpluses users gain from potential
interactions (Hagiu & Wright, 2018).
2.2. Digital openness dimensions & signature
Platform openness is defined as “the extent that [the platform]
places fewer restrictions on participation, development, or use across its
distinct roles, whether for developer or end user” (Eisenmann, Parker, &
Van Alstyne, 2009). Previous research (Boudreau, 2010; Eisenmann
et al., 2009) defines actor openness according to two dimensions: access
(i.e., who is allowed access to the platform?) and authority (i.e., how
much is the actor allowed to do on the platform?).5 A platform is “open”
to the extent that: (1) no restrictions are placed on participation in its
development, commercialization or use (access); and (2) any restric-
tions (authority) are reasonable and non-discriminatory regarding entry
requirements, requirements to conform with technical standards, or
payment of licensing fees (Eisenmann et al., 2009). This definition helps
to understand platform's openness to its external partnering users, but
focuses purely on firm-external platform aspects of tapping into the
requisite variety offered by external parties (Thomas et al., 2014). As
such, it foregoes the firm-internal platform types and aspects such as
how the platform selects, ranks and represents offerings, and provides
access to products and information. As a consequence, it neglects the
openness to two other, internal non-actor platform dimensions, namely
product categories and channels offered. We argue that, apart from
making decisions on who is allowed on the platform and how much
authority is granted to these users, platforms also need to decide on
categories (“what”) of assortments and brands and the channels (“where”)
of communication and distribution (Kumar, George, & Pancras, 2008;
Neslin et al., 2014). Categories and channels constitute an important
part of the platform's business model (Osterwalder & Pigneur, 2010),
and changes to the platform's openness toward product categories
(what products are offered?) and channels (through which channels is
the product communicated and delivered?) have important implica-
tions for how value is created for customers (Saghiri, Wilding, Mena, &
Bourlakis, 2017). These internal non-actor platform dimensions con-
sequently are essential separate dimensions that are complementary to
the user-related platform dimensions in creating value for customers.
The openness on all these dimensions (or attributes) is expected to
define the digital platform signature; that is, the platform's image or
fingerprint for openness as perceived by its users.
Hence, platforms need to define their openness for each of the fol-
lowing five openness dimensions: three actor-based (suppliers, custo-
mers, complementary services providers), and two nonactor-based
(categories and channels) dimensions. For the former, openness is a
two-dimensional construct comprising both access and authority, while
for the latter it relates to access only (see Table 1).
3 Thomas et al. (2014) distinguish the market intermediary form from orga-
nizational platforms (as organizational capabilities enabling superior perfor-
mance), product family platforms (a product family leading to derivative pro-
ducts) and platform ecosystem (as industry architectures, like the Internet).
(footnote continued)
Though our focus is on market intermediary platforms, we do not exclude re-
levant papers discussing related platform forms.
4 Platforms' core product can include goods, services or information.
5 Although the two dimensions constitute openness, note that these dimen-
sions are distinct and not necessarily highly correlated. Platforms can be very
open on access while being very restrictive in giving up control; at the same
time, platforms can grant much authority to a select group of users. For plat-
forms delivering products to customers, suppliers' authority goes beyond the
mere activities on the platform itself but also includes the freedom to customize
the delivery and pricing of these products.
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Supplier openness refers to the degree of access that suppliers, who
are not part of the platform, have to the platform, and what they are
allowed to do on the platform (Van Alstyne et al., 2016a, 2016b). In
terms of access, platforms can become less open by not allowing each
supplier to access the platform. In terms of authority, platforms can
either use a restrictive controlling strategy, or alternatively give up
some control and use an enabling strategy in which some decisions
(also known as ‘transfer rights’) are transferred to the supplier (e.g., the
degree to which suppliers are allowed to directly interact with the
customer when it comes to product delivery) (Hagiu & Wright, 2018);
enabling platforms allow for less restrictive selection, monitoring and
abandoning of suppliers, while controlling platforms use a less open
strategy by placing more requirements on suppliers, e.g., by inducing
exclusive entry or even exit costs.
Customer openness refers to the degree of access that customers6
have to a platform, and what they are allowed to do. Apart from re-
stricting access based on explicit criteria (e.g., nationality, language,
age, and/or gender) (Mačiulienė & Skaržauskienė, 2016), platforms
may also implicitly preselect them by favoring and serving a specific
target market. This target market is then served using a preselected
retail mix including pricing, promotion, product assortment, delivery
and after-sales services, among others. In terms of authority, certain
digital platforms allow customers to co-create value by providing access
to the production, assembly, delivery, marketing and service phase (cf.
Balka, Raasch, & Herstatt, 2014; Cui & Wu, 2016). Customers can co-
produce, design, modify or assemble product offerings (Wikipedia,
Threadless t-shirts, Makerbot 3D printing), participate in delivery (pick-
up points), engage in promotional activities (Kickstarter project en-
dorsements to friends), or write reviews (Amazon).
Complementary service provider openness refers to the degree of access
and authority given to external service providers that complement the
platform's core product (Kannan, 2017; Suarez & Cusumano, 2010).
Such providers constitute a broad group often defined as “com-
plementary service providers,” “sponsors” or “interoperable platforms”
(cf. Gebregiorgis & Altmann, 2015; Ondrus et al., 2015). We define
complementary service providers broadly, and include all com-
plementary services provided by external parties like payment, finan-
cing, insurance, security, and delivery services, but also the linking with
other interoperable platforms to allow for cross-platform access (e.g.,
Facebook users using their account to log in on befriended platforms).
Category openness refers to the openness to the number of product
categories and items offered on the platform. Category decisions refer
to the overall composition of the assortments in terms of breadth
(number of categories) and depth (number of items within a category)
as well as their relations to each other (e.g., substitutive, com-
plementary, and independent). Important in this aspect is the fact that,
in the decision process on category openness, platforms have to dis-
tinguish between (a) the choice on which categories to carry and (b) the
selection and display of specific product items (e.g., representing as
many items as possible versus a selection of premium or price-promoted
items; or displaying single vs. multiple offerings of the same item). For
platforms, customers' assortment quality perceptions, which are es-
sential to value creation (Sirohi, McLaughlin, & Wittink, 1998), are
driven by the specific set of products shown – selected from the full
assortment – and the way these products are presented. Discount
platforms may increase assortment value by prominently displaying
product items that are on sale, whereas platforms focusing on fast and
convenient transactions may limit product category choice and selec-
tively display a relevant set of product categories or items (possibly
based on individual customers' prior search and purchase behavior).
Channel openness refers to the openness of the digital platform to
access it via a variety of communication and distribution streams (cf.
Saghiri et al., 2017). Digital platforms may vary in allowing its users to
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access the platform (e.g., WhatsApp's messaging is predominantly de-
signed for mobile phone use, while competitors like Signal and Tele-
gram promote access also via other online devices such as tablets and
desktops). Platforms may increase channel openness by using more
digital and physical channels and/or by allowing customers to switch
seamlessly between channels (De Haan, Kannan, Verhoef, & Wiesel,
2018). Platforms may also restrict certain channel functionalities in
terms of search, evaluation, transaction, pick-up and return of products
(Herhausen, Binder, Schoegel, & Herrmann, 2015). Importantly, plat-
forms may choose to create channel synergies by enabling the access to
resources of other channels (e.g., ordering products from Amazon
marketplace, while shopping in Amazon's physical store; Verhoef,
Neslin, & Vroomen, 2007).
Note that a single decision regarding openness may affect multiple
openness dimensions simultaneously. For instance, the decision to re-
strict the number of channels suppliers are allowed to use in their
customer interactions not only affects channel openness, but also affects
supplier authority openness. Hence, platforms should take a holistic
approach to platform openness, as platform openness involves a set of
interdependent dimensions. Making decisions on each openness di-
mension in isolation may lead to unexpected, and undesirable effects.
2.3. Embedding platform openness in a larger nomological net
To embed the concept of platform openness, we provide a simple
organizing research framework, depicted in Fig. 1, that identifies a set
of drivers that influence platform's decisions on openness and platform
signature. The drivers do not deterministically define an ideal config-
uration of platform openness, but they guide the decision making of
platforms in the degree to which they can open their platform and seek
particular outcomes. Changes to platform openness are inherently
linked to the underlying business model, as “any change in openness…
may influence the value proposition of products and services offered by a
platform owner, resulting in potential changes to price and structure” (Wan,
Cenamor, Parker, & Van Alstyne, 2017: 9), which in turn will affect the
popularity and attractiveness of the platform to customers and sup-
pliers. Our framework thus assumes that such decisions on openness
(objective attributes) relate to the platform's signature (perceived
openness), which in turn leads to outcomes in terms of the creation of
value for its users and the appropriation of that value. Hence, changes
to platform openness likely have financial consequences, as openness
determines the value the platform creates to its users as well as how
much it can appropriate.7 Although value creation is important to the
initial and prolonged success of platforms, ultimately, a platform should
be able to capture value from its activities to survive (Teece, 2010). Our
framework further acknowledges the dynamics and interdependencies
that characterize platforms.
3. Methods
This paper employs three steps to (i) analyze the empirical re-
lationships of platform openness with other concepts (based on a
Fig. 1. Research model.
7 Note that we do not claim that (objective) platform openness or (subjective)
platform signature determine platform success. We only assert that changes to
platform openness or signature likely influence platform's financial perfor-
mance through altering value creation and appropriation. We thank an anon-
ymous reviewer for highlighting this issue.
T.L.J. Broekhuizen, et al. Journal of Business Research xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
4
Ta
bl
e2
Ou
tco
me
so
fp
lat
for
m
op
en
ne
ss.
Sta
ke
ho
lde
rb
en
efi
ts/
co
sts
Su
pp
lie
rs
Cu
sto
me
rs
Co
mp
lem
en
tar
ys
erv
ice
pr
ov
ide
rs
Ca
teg
or
ies
Ch
an
ne
ls
Ac
ce
ss
Au
th
or
ity
Ac
ce
ss
Au
th
or
ity
Ac
ce
ss
Au
th
or
ity
Pla
tfo
rm
Be
ne
fit
s
Ab
ili
ty
to
cre
ate
va
lue
/g
ro
w
+
[1
,1
5,
16
,1
7,
19
,2
0]
+
+
+
[N
P3
]
+
[N
P4
]
Ab
ili
ty
to
ca
ptu
re
ren
ts
−
[1
,1
5,
17
,1
8]
−
+
−
−
−
Ac
ce
ss
to
us
er
res
ou
rce
s
+
[6
,9
,1
5]
+
[1
2]
+
+
[1
2]
+
+
[1
2]
Cr
os
s-s
ell
ing
op
po
rtu
nit
ies
+
[1
5]
+
[N
P2
]
Sh
ari
ng
of
pla
tfo
rm
de
ve
lop
me
nt
co
sts
+
[8
,9
,1
7]
+
Inn
ov
ati
on
+
[2
,3
,1
2,
17
] /−
[8
,2
0]
+
[2
,6
,7
,1
2,
20
]
+
[1
2]
+
+
[1
2]
Ab
ili
ty
to
diff
ere
nt
iat
e
−
[5
,9
,1
8]
+
[6
]
−
+
Co
sts Us
er
co
or
din
ati
on
co
sts
an
di
ssu
es
+
[2
,1
0,
12
,2
0]
+
[1
2]
0
0
+
+
n.a
.
n.a
.
No
n-u
ser
op
era
tio
na
lc
os
ts
n.a
.
n.a
.
n.a
.
n.a
.
n.a
.
n.a
.
+
+
Cu
sto
me
rs
Be
ne
fit
s
Co
-cr
ea
tio
no
pp
or
tu
nit
ies
+
[1
2]
+
[1
,1
2]
+
[1
2]
+
Ch
oic
e:
siz
e,
va
rie
ty
an
dq
ua
lit
yo
fm
erc
ha
nd
ise
or
ser
vic
eo
pti
on
s
+
[1
,2
,3
,7
,2
0]
+
+
+
+
Co
sts Se
arc
h
co
sts
0/
+
+
+
/−
+
+
−
−
Po
or
qu
ali
ty
de
liv
ery
0/
+
[2
0]
+
[N
P1
] /−
[1
3]
Su
pp
lie
rs
Be
ne
fit
s
Ab
ili
ty
to
diff
ere
nt
iat
e
−
+
−
+
Co
-cr
ea
tio
no
pp
or
tu
nit
ies
+
[1
2]
+
[1
2]
Co
sts Co
mp
eti
tiv
ei
nt
en
sit
y
+
[2
,2
0]
+
/−
[1
2]
+
+
/−
[1
2]
No
te:
be
ne
fit
or
co
st
is
en
ha
nc
ed
(+
)o
rr
ed
uc
ed
(−
)w
he
no
pe
nn
ess
inc
rea
ses
.A
0m
ea
ns
th
at
th
ec
os
ts
ca
nb
em
arg
ina
li
fm
an
ag
ed
we
ll
by
th
ep
lat
for
m.
No
tes
:
Stu
dy
pla
tfo
rm
stu
die
s
No
n-p
lat
for
m
stu
die
s
1.
Al
ex
y,
W
est
,K
lap
pe
r,
an
dR
eit
zig
(2
01
8)
(C
)
NP
1
Fr
an
ke
et
al.
(2
01
0)
(E
)
2.
Bo
ud
rea
u(
20
10
)(
E)
NP
2
Ku
ma
re
ta
l.
(2
00
8)
(E
)
3.
Bo
ud
rea
u(
20
12
)(
E)
NP
3
Op
pe
wa
la
nd
Ko
ele
me
ije
r(
20
05
)(
E)
4.
Bo
ud
rea
ua
nd
Je
pp
ese
n
(2
01
5)
(E
)
NP
4
W
an
ge
ta
l.
(2
01
5)
(E
)
5.
Ce
cc
ag
no
li,
Fo
rm
an
,H
ua
ng
,a
nd
W
u(
20
12
)(
E)
6.
Ce
nn
am
oa
nd
Sa
nt
alo
(2
01
3)
(E
)
7.
Ce
nn
am
o(
20
18
)(
E)
8.
Eis
en
ma
nn
et
al.
(2
00
6)
(C
)
9.
Eis
en
ma
nn
et
al.
(2
00
9)
(E
)
10
.G
aw
er
an
dC
us
um
an
o(
20
02
)(
C)
11
.G
rø
tn
es
(2
00
9)
(E
)
12
.H
ag
iu
an
dW
rig
ht
(2
01
8)
(C
)
13
.H
eid
en
rei
ch
et
al.
(2
01
5)
(E
)
14
.J
ac
ob
ide
se
ta
l.
(2
01
8)
(C
)
15
.O
nd
ru
se
ta
l.
(2
01
5)
(E
)
16
.P
ark
er
an
dV
an
Al
sty
ne
(2
01
7)
(C
)
17
.P
ark
er,
Va
n
Al
sty
ne
,a
nd
Jia
ng
(2
01
6)
(E
)
18
.W
an
ge
ta
l.
(2
01
5)
(E
)
19
.W
est
(2
00
3)
(E
)
20
.W
ess
el
et
al.
(2
01
7)
(E
)
No
te:
(C
)=
co
nc
ep
tu
al
pa
pe
r,
(E
)=
em
pir
ica
lp
ap
er.
T.L.J. Broekhuizen, et al. Journal of Business Research xxx (xxxx) xxx–xxx
5
scoping review), (ii) identify existing business challenges (based on
academic-industry expert interactions) and (iii) synthesize the findings
of this mixed method approach to derive research challenges. These
three steps are described as follows:
Step 1:We start with a scoping literature review (Arksey & O'Malley,
2005; Paré, Trudel, Jaana & Kitsiou, 2015) to take stock of the existing
literature on the dimensions, drivers and outcomes of platform open-
ness. We examine the extent, range and nature of research that has been
performed on these topics from a theoretical, conceptual and/or em-
pirical view to identify “what we already know”. Appendix I describes
the details of our review, while Table 2 summarizes the results of our
review.
Step 2: In a second step, we identify the business challenges related
to managing platform openness in practice. To develop an in-depth
understanding of the business challenges that managers face, we con-
vened with executives from four companies to discuss their challenges,
opportunities, and realities regarding the management of digital busi-
ness. In multiple interactive panel sessions, during a two-day Thought
Leadership conference on Digital Business Models, 40 scholars and 5
industry experts shared their academic and business insights. In this
stage, we also assembled a cohort of digital platforms and categorized
them according to their platform openness characteristics. In order to
achieve a proper breadth in understanding the variety, we reviewed
existing studies providing systematic classifications or taxonomies and
selected a range of platforms from multiple sectors. By analyzing the
selected cases, we highlight the complexity of managing platform
openness in practice.
Step 3: In the final step, we contrast the existing academic knowl-
edge with the business challenges to infer managerially relevant re-
search challenges that may help future research to overcome them in
future studies.
4. Literature scoping review: drivers and outcomes of platform
openness
4.1. Supplier openness
4.1.1. Outcomes of supplier openness
The evidence found in the literature of providing greater supplier
openness mostly focused on the access dimension, and much less on the
authority dimension (for a notable exception, see Hagiu & Wright,
2018). In terms of access, platforms are encouraged to attract large
numbers of suppliers to produce an attractive assortment to increase
customer utility and enhance the ability to grow (Ondrus et al., 2015);
the increasing assortment size allows the platform to cross-sell items
and improves profitability (Kumar et al., 2008). Furthermore, the de-
velopment and promotional costs to build the platform can be shared
(Eisenmann et al., 2006, 2009). A downside of this greater openness is
the greater difficulty of appropriating rents, as it leads to a greater
dependency on and a corresponding need to share the profits with
suppliers. Next, platforms with greater supplier openness face difficul-
ties to differentiate the platform, as competitive platforms can easily
“buy” the same product offerings from the same suppliers (Wirtz &
Ehret, 2018). Securing supplier exclusivity is, however, not always an
option, and can be very costly (Eisenmann et al., 2006). Managing a
greater number of suppliers generally also increases coordination costs,
as costs of failure, monitoring and communication increase with more
suppliers (Hagiu & Wright, 2018). Without proper quality checks,
greater openness diminishes the level of control over suppliers, which
ultimately increases the likelihood that customers will be confronted
with suppliers of poor quality (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002).
Many platform studies investigated the impact of supplier openness
on platform innovation, as indicated by the platform's supply of novel
products that are new to the market and not offered by competitors.
Results were mixed. In terms of access, greater openness enhances
platform innovativeness, but suppliers innovate less with increased
supplier competition (Boudreau, 2010). To increase innovation, plat-
forms need to attract a pool of heterogeneous suppliers to create a
collective diversity (Boudreau, 2012). Boudreau (2010) demonstrated
that granting access is more effective in improving innovativeness
compared to giving greater authority to suppliers. Increasing the
number of suppliers, however, decreases suppliers' innovation in-
centives, as the greater competition intensity –especially when similar
products are offered– reduces their profitability.
In terms of authority, the preferential or discriminatory treatment of
suppliers is considered to reduce supplier openness in terms of au-
thority (Eisenmann et al., 2009). Related to this preferential or dis-
criminatory treatment, Cennamo (2018) found that stimulating the
number of suppliers by introducing platform-owned suppliers para-
doxically lowers platform's ultimate penetration, as it reduces innova-
tion incentives of external suppliers that lower overall platform pene-
tration and performance. Sweet-hearting deals may persuade and
secure suppliers to make huge ex ante investments and introduce ex-
tremely high-quality products solely for the platform (Binken &
Stremersch, 2009; Eisenmann et al., 2006), but at the same time such a
strategy clearly reduces incentives for nonpreferred suppliers to in-
novate and deliver high-quality products (Cennamo, 2018; Cennamo &
Santalo, 2013).
Providing suppliers more authority and freedom is valued by sup-
pliers. Hilkert, Benlian, Sarstedt, and Hess (2011) found that suppliers
(i.e., app developers) of a software platform are more satisfied when
they receive greater authority. They appreciate the greater freedom to
co-create value with end-users and to differentiate themselves from
other providers on the platform (Benlian, Hilkert, & Hess, 2015).
4.1.2. Drivers of supplier openness
While some empirical evidence exists on how external drivers in-
fluence openness, such evidence is missing for internal platform char-
acteristics (e.g., platform orientation, CEO's preference). Regarding
supplier characteristics, a greater variability in quality among suppliers
increases the chances that platforms opt for restrictive sourcing. When
supply varies greatly in terms of quality, and when customers value
quality, markets tend to be characterized by increasing returns to
quality in which high quality offerings dominate the market (cf. Binken
& Stremersch, 2009). In such circumstances, platforms benefit from
attracting a restricted set of high-quality suppliers and secure their
platform exclusivity – even if such high-quality providers do not pro-
vide an extra boost to platform adoption, it takes away the opportunity
for rival platforms to increase their platform sales (Binken &
Stremersch, 2009).
Market characteristics, like industry maturity, also drive supplier
openness (Eisenmann, 2007, 2008; Gawer, 2009). In nascent or highly
turbulent markets, where innovation is important but risky, platforms
often choose to open up and stimulate supplier-led innovation, thereby
shifting the risk to invest in the wrong technology to suppliers (cf.
Teece, 1986). When shifting from the market growth to maturity phase,
knowledge becomes more readily available about the performance of
suppliers, and platform differentiation becomes more difficult to
achieve. In search for differentiation, platforms try to secure the ex-
clusivity of the high-quality suppliers by giving them greater authority
and more benefits, or by acquiring them (Cennamo & Santalo, 2013;
Mantena, Sankaranarayanan, & Viswanathan, 2010; Muzellec, Ronteau,
& Lambkin, 2015). Hence, as markets mature, platforms tend to become
more restrictive regarding the sourcing of suppliers.
Product characteristics, such as product complexity, also drive
supplier openness (Hagiu & Wright, 2018). For complex products like
medication and technical tools, customers may need explanation and
support from experts to make the right decision. When platforms are
held responsible, they become wary to transfer decision rights to sup-
pliers, and hence restrict access and lower levels of authority. Only
when such instructions can be standardized and executed well by
suppliers, then platforms may grant some authority and freedom on
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non-key aspects.
4.2. Customer openness
4.2.1. Outcomes of customer openness
In terms of access, platforms choose to increase their openness to-
ward customers – using a mass market rather than a niche approach – to
stimulate the occurrence of network effects. A downside of this ap-
proach is that it can result in a “one-size-fits-all” solution that lacks a
focus and ignores the specific needs of customers (West, 2003; Wirtz &
Ehret, 2018).
In terms of authority, platforms choose to give customers more
control to make use of their resources, such as knowledge, creativity,
and other valuable assets (Thomas et al., 2014). The use of customers'
knowledge and creative resources help to stimulate platform innova-
tion, as evidenced on crowdsourcing platforms (Dell Storms, LEGO
ideas) and on apparel platforms (Threadless, NIKEiD). Customers, who
are given greater authority, for instance, by taking on the role of sup-
pliers when selling (eBay) or sharing of properties or possessions
(Airbnb, Sharely), or by taking on the role of complementary service
providers when writing product reviews for other customers (IMDb and
Booking.com), may receive additional value from the co-creation pro-
cess. Customers value co-creation opportunities, as it helps them to find
or customize products to more closely fit their needs, and/or because of
the value derived from the process itself (Cui & Wu, 2016), also known
as the “I designed it myself” effect (Franke, Schreier, & Kaiser, 2010).
However, as they make ex ante investments and share their valuable
resources, such enabling may restrict platforms' ability to capture value.
Next, a downside of giving customers greater freedom and influence is
that they lower control and increase the risk to dissatisfy and frustrate
customers (Gebauer, Füller, & Pezzei, 2013; Heidenreich, Wittkowski,
Handrich, & Falk, 2015).
4.2.2. Drivers of customer openness
When customers have rather homogeneous needs and do not need
special features, open mass market strategies help to attain network
effects and win the battle for network dominance (cf. Eisenmann et al.,
2006). Restrictions – that is, restricting customer access or targeting
specific niches – only make sense when customers are quality conscious
and/or when negative same-side effects occur on the customer side. The
selectiveness of platforms toward customers can provide members who
value exclusivity with desired membership benefits for which they are
willing to pay extra. To create prestigious and exclusive atmospheres,
platforms selling luxury brands often decide to restrict accessibility
(Hennigs, Wiedmann, & Klarmann, 2012), as expanding to new cus-
tomer segments may alienate existing users (cf. Cennamo & Santalo,
2015).
Industry maturity also plays an important role in driving customer
openness. In emerging or nascent markets, when turbulence is high and
customer needs are relatively unknown, platforms do well to target a
relatively small and homogenous niche (Nemati & Khajeheian, 2018;
Sawhney, 1998). In line with Blake Masters and Peter Thiel's adage to
attain a monopoly by first dominating a new niche market rather than
the pursuit of market share in a larger, preexisting market (Masters &
Thiel, 2014), platforms operating in new markets should cast a narrow
net and concentrate on serving a niche that can serve as a base for
expansion into related segments and application markets (Sawhney,
1998).
In terms of authority, platforms grant customers decision rights
when customers know their roles and are capable of performing the task
at hand (Hagiu & Wright, 2018; Meuter, Bitner, Ostrom, & Brown,
2005). Platforms face difficulties to grant decision rights and allow for
co-creation when customers have greater privacy concerns that limit
their willingness to share personal information with the platform
(Cavusoglu, Phan, Cavusoglu, & Airoldi, 2016; Tajvidi, Richard, Wang,
& Hajli, 2018).
4.3. Complementary service provider openness
4.3.1. Outcomes of complementary service provider openness
Although the type of product differs (i.e., core product versus
complementary service), the outcomes of openness to complementary
service providers tend to be similar to those related to suppliers. Yet, in
comparison to the outcomes of supplier openness, research has paid
much less attention to investigate complementary service provider
openness. Research shows that platforms may increase the openness
toward complementary providers to further improve the platform's core
offering. Increasing openness to external complementary service pro-
viders helps to reduce customer risks via the offering of specific pay-
ment systems, like escrow services (PayPal) that can provide structural
assurance and reduce monetary risks (Fang et al., 2014).
4.3.2. Drivers of complementary service provider openness
Certain digital or software platform types, because of their high
modularity and ease of integration, are more amenable to include
complementary service providers than others (Ondrus et al., 2015).
Platforms are likely to be more open to complementary service provi-
ders when customers' tastes and risk attitudes differ, as it can add value
by matching the numerous high-variety customers to specific com-
plementary service providers (Gawer, 2009). A greater inclusion of
providers may cater to the heterogeneous customer needs through of-
fering customizable options around the (standardized) core product.
Next, customers' risk can be mitigated effectively by providing addi-
tional payment or security services (Fang et al., 2014).
4.4. Category openness
4.4.1. Outcomes of category openness
Platforms' choice for the breadth (number of categories) and depth
(number of items) of the products offered constitute an important part
of their value proposition. Popular platforms such as Amazon, Netflix,
iTunes and Booking.com can be driven by the need to offer ever-in-
creasing assortment sizes, according to the premise that customers
value products chosen from plentiful assortments (Mathmann,
Chylinski, De Ruyter, & Higgens, 2017). The outcome of greater
openness toward categories is, however, not straightforward due to the
dynamics of customer preferences and evolving competition (Mantrala
et al., 2009): an ongoing debate exists on whether “more-is-better”
(Oppewal & Koelemeijer, 2005) or that “less-is-more” (Iyengar &
Lepper, 2000). Larger assortments increase the likelihood that custo-
mers can find a product that closely meets their needs and facilitate
product comparisons, but may also induce additional cognitive costs
and cause choice overload in digital environments with unlimited shelf
space (Lee & Lee, 2004). Empirical findings demonstrate that customer
preference for larger assortments is subject to diminishing returns. Al-
though greater category openness may initially increase anticipated
consumption utility, purchasing probability, and ease of comparison, at
high levels of category openness, the marginal benefit of additional
categories is offset against the costs of choice overload that complicate
decision making and decrease both purchasing probability and sa-
tisfaction (Chernev, Böckenholt, & Goodman, 2015; Mathmann et al.,
2017).
4.4.2. Drivers of category openness
Platforms' tendency to increase the number of categories is strongly
driven by customers' heterogeneity and desire for variety (Sloot, Fok, &
Verhoef, 2006). Customers' search for variety can cause market ex-
pansion effects that, in turn, encourage platforms to expand the number
of categories offered (Cachon, Terwiesch, & Xu, 2008; Datta, Knox, &
Bronnenberg, 2018). Apart from customers' desire for variety, a higher
levels of customers' assessment orientation (i.e., the desire to thor-
oughly assess a broad spectrum of choices before deciding) (Mathmann
et al., 2017), as well as their desire for one-stop shopping (Messinger &
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Narasimhan, 1997) call for higher category openness.
Technological drivers, especially in the field of search technology,
can lower customer search costs, facilitate product comparisons, reduce
choice sets and decision task complexity, and thus mitigate the risks of
choice overload (Lynch & Ariely, 2000). Such technologies enable
platforms to enlarge product categories for niche products, which can
result in fatter and longer long tails (Brynjolfsson, Hu, & Simester,
2011; Hinz, Hill, & Kim, 2016).
Product complexity drives category openness via increasing the
costs of broadening product categories because platforms then endure
higher costs to train staff and monitor suppliers to maintain a minimum
level of control and ensure product quality. Higher levels of desired
product quality call for more specialization of the platform (Chernev &
Hamilton, 2009; Kwak, Duvvuri, & Russell, 2015).
4.5. Channel openness
4.5.1. Outcomes of channel openness
Previous studies find positive platform outcomes from channel
openness, also coined as the “availability effect,” because adding
channels decrease customer search costs and lead to increased sales
(Neslin et al., 2006; Wang, Malthouse, & Krishnamurthi, 2015). In-
creasing the distributive reach through adding physical connections to
the online platform has been found to increase overall transactions
because of the acquisition of new customers (Avery, Steenburgh,
Deighton, & Caravella, 2012) and greater customer retention (Pauwels
& Neslin, 2015). However, high channel openness also increases (non-
user) operational costs. Apart from higher operational costs, opening up
the platform via the introduction of a physical channel also increased
product returns (Pauwels & Neslin, 2015). Yet, the cannibalization ef-
fects of introducing a physical channel next to an online channel are
limited, and in some cases positive cross-channel synergies exist that
stimulate online sales (Avery et al., 2012).
Restricting channels' functionalities have mixed outcomes. On the
one hand, restricting channels in their ability to perform specific
functions may lead to fewer channel conflicts and higher sales success,
as channels can more easily differentiate themselves (Fürst, Leimbach,
& Prigge, 2017). On the other hand, restricting channels to perform
specific functions may lead to disadvantages in the “competition for
customer's mindsets” as dissimilar appearances of the platform across
channels decrease customers' patronage intentions (Emrich & Verhoef,
2015).
4.5.2. Drivers of channel openness
As an internal driver, Jindal, Reinartz, Krafft, and Hoyer (2007)
found that a firm's cost or differentiation focus determined channel
openness: low-cost platforms prefer high levels of channel openness to
increase market coverage and attain economies of scale, while com-
panies scoring high on customer orientation tend to show low channel
openness to avoid conflicts with resellers and build strong(er) re-
lationships with customers.
Market characteristics, like turbulence and level of competition, also
drive channel openness decisions via market valuation. For instance,
firms operating in highly competitive, and highly turbulent markets
benefit more strongly from offering additional channels in terms of
market valuation growth than those operating in less dynamic markets
(Homburg, Vollmayr, & Hahn, 2014). First-mover platforms benefit less
from higher channel openness (e.g., addition of online channel) than
early followers (Geyskens, Gielens, & Dekimpe, 2002).
Product characteristics affect openness decisions in several ways.
Neslin et al. (2014) conceptualize about the possible interactions be-
tween what to buy (products or brands) and where to buy (channels).
Hedonic or luxury products such as jewelry, cosmetics and fashion in-
centivize high channel openness of platforms because customers want
to experience the products across different channels, whereas purchase
of utilitarian products happens in specific channels, promoting low
openness (Kushwaha & Shankar, 2013). Emrich, Paul, and Rudolph
(2015) showed that channel openness is particularly desired when
product categories offered have high substitutive relations (such as with
specialist retailers carrying deep categories), whereas for products with
high independent relations (such as with general merchandisers car-
rying broad, unrelated categories) a more selective approach may be
favored in which the digital platform provides a larger assortment than
the other channels.
Finally, regarding customer characteristics, more knowledgeable
and experienced online customers require lower levels of channel
openness (Cao & Li, 2015; Jindal et al., 2007). In contrast, more in-
novative customers (Konuş, Verhoef, & Neslin, 2008) and more ex-
periential shoppers (Pauwels & Neslin, 2015) prefer to use multiple
channels, which call for higher levels of channel openness.
5. Business challenges: what do we need to know?
In this section, we shift from the academic perspective of what has
been studied to the business perspective of making effective platform
signature decisions. Based on the business challenges identified, we
reflect on and categorize a number of business examples to explain the
complexity of managing platform openness in practice due to the in-
terplay of dimensions, the interdependencies between actors, and
platform dynamics.
5.1. Platform openness is a complex interplay of openness on underlying
dimensions
In practice, deciding on platform openness is not a simple dichot-
omous choice between open vs. closed, but it rather involves a complex
set of decisions on how to configure openness on each dimension. In
Table 3, we categorize several intermediary platforms, and find that
platforms substantially differ in their openness scores on the dimen-
sions, but also that different constellations of openness, or platform
signatures exist. Our taxonomy differs from existing empirical typolo-
gies that limit their focus to the interplay between users and platform
intermediation (e.g., Perren & Kozinets, 2018), as we also include the
openness to channels and product categories. Our classification of
unified vs. diversified, price vs. service quality, and frictionless vs. experi-
ential (for an explanation, see Table 3) is neither theoretically grounded
nor exhaustive, but is merely used to display the diversity of platform
signatures.
From a managerial perspective, platforms face the challenging task
to configure openness in such a way that the ‘right’ set of suppliers and
complementary service providers are matched to the ‘right’ set of cus-
tomers using the ‘right’ selection of product categories and channels. To
complicate matters, the effects of the underlying dimensions are not
uniform and interdependencies can exist between dimensions, such that
the effect of opening up one dimension may strengthen or weaken the
effect of another. For instance, if the platform follows a growth strategy
using a high openness toward suppliers, it may accelerate growth when
combining this dimension with high levels of openness to customers
(greater market potential), product categories (cross-selling opportu-
nities) and channels (availability effect). But, at the same time, this
opening up creates additional platform challenges to detect opportu-
nistic behavior or low-quality sellers, to facilitate customer search
within the wider range of product categories, and to coordinate product
flows and product returns due to the increased complexity. Although
channels interfaces can be tailored to the demands of specific customer
segments to still create economies of scope (see example of OTTO in
Table 3), coordination efforts tend to increase to avoid channel conflicts
(Lemon & Verhoef, 2016).
Hence, multiple configurations exist, and there seems to be no single
best approach. Assuming that the dimensions do not influence each
other can be risky and lead to wrong decisions. Openness decisions
should holistically be determined to see which configuration is most
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successful, and fits given the characteristics of the demand side (cus-
tomer heterogeneity, need for variety, quality and price consciousness),
the supply side (heterogeneity in supply and quality), the product at
hand (complexity), as well as the platform characteristics (orientation,
prior success). Interdependencies between the openness dimensions can
enable synergies but may also hamper the performance of other di-
mensions. What business need to know is how this openness framework
can be used to identify opportunities and threats that emerge from the
configuration of openness decisions across the dimensions, and their
resulting synergetic and competitive effects, such that a desired plat-
form signature can be formed.
5.2. Openness decisions are subject to actor interdependencies and tradeoffs
In the previous section, we identified the interdependencies (com-
petitive or synergetic effects) that exist between dimensions, but in-
terdependencies also exist between platform users (De Reuver,
Verschuur, Nikayin, Cerpa, & Bouwman, 2015; Wan et al., 2017) such
that improving the outcomes of one actor will influence the outcome
(benefit or cost) of another user. Increased supplier openness may lead
to a broader choice set for customers, but for suppliers it simultaneously
increases competition that tightens profit margins. As platforms need to
create value to both sides, actor interdependencies can cause tradeoffs
to the platform: favoring one side will, in many cases, hurt the other
side, as the different users have mixed and potentially conflicting
strategic objectives and interests (De Reuver et al., 2015). Although
Cambridge Analytica benefitted from greater authority to collect more
data from Facebook users, it harmed the privacy of Facebook users who
lost confidence in the platform's integrity. Designing an effective plat-
form signature thus becomes more complex as these tradeoffs will have
to be considered simultaneously.
What business needs to know is how openness decisions engender
tradeoffs by analyzing how favoring one type of user reduces value for
other users. As not all openness decisions imply a tradeoff (a zero-sum
or win-lose game), businesses also need to know under what circum-
stances openness decisions may create simultaneous benefits (a posi-
tive-sum or win-win game) for multiple users. Furthermore, business
needs to acquire knowledge on how to resolve conflicts between users
and maintain their commitment to the platform.
5.3. Openness decisions are subject to platform dynamics
Based on real-life business cases and case descriptions in articles,
sufficient empirical evidence exists that platforms can deliberately
change their openness, but that such decisions are also subject to, and
influenced by past decisions and platform evolution (Eisenmann, 2008;
Gawer & Cusumano, 2008). Platforms may change their organizational
goals during platform evolution. New platforms usually focus on
building user bases by offering a relatively small and well-defined set of
product categories and channels, and then in growth phases deliber-
ately open their channels and product categories to increase value for
its users. But once critical masses appear on both user sides, platforms'
strategic focus tends to shift from open (value creation) to closed (value
appropriation) models. In time, with increasing competition between
platforms, platforms' need for differentiation also becomes stronger,
making it more likely that they will secure exclusivity in supply and/or
develop unique platform-based products.
A platform's evolution does not always follow a predictable path, as
specific events (e.g., scandals, market updates) may pressure platforms
to react and adjust their openness strategy. Etsy, an online marketplace
for arts and crafts supplies, was pushed to alter its openness strategy in
response to shareholder pressure (Gelles, 2017). In an attempt to win
back lost customers, Etsy expanded on its platform-based services by
more strongly assuring refunding in case of problems, and by restricting
access to a smaller set of suppliers and limiting their authority to set
price conditions (i.e., mandatory use of all-inclusive pricing).
Although platforms may be more powerful than their users, they
need to be cautious when restricting platform openness to capture more
rents. Such decisions may help to capture more value in the short run,
but may backfire in the long run by increasing conflicts and distrust that
lower users' willingness to support and transact via the platform. Such
restrictions can have long-lasting effects on platform performance, as
existing customers tend to leave when they can no longer find their
preferred suppliers, complementary services, channels and categories
(cf. Neslin & Shankar, 2009; Payne & Frow, 2004).
What business needs to know is how to project the implications of
openness decisions to account for endogenous dynamics and changing
platform objectives. Such information is needed upfront, as platform
decisions become more rigid and difficult to change over time.8 Fur-
thermore, platforms need to know to what degree restricting openness
(using a variety of measures that vary in severity) harms their power
and affects their short-term and long-term performance.
6. Research challenges in platform openness research: how to
move forward?
Based on what we already know (Section 4) and need to know
(Section 5), we identify four research challenges that may guide future
research on platform openness regarding (a) its conceptualization and
measurement, (b) the identification of drivers and outcomes, (c) the
incorporation of interdependencies, and (d) the incorporation of plat-
form dynamics.
6.1. Conceptualizing and measuring platform openness
Little agreement exists in the literature on how to dimensionalize
and measure the concept of platform openness. One of the reasons for
this lack is that it is a multidimensional construct that can be measured
– at different levels (cf. Ondrus et al., 2015; Thomas et al., 2014) – both
objectively and subjectively. To resolve ambiguity and stimulate cu-
mulativeness of research, scholars should clearly define (a) the level of
measurement (at what level: organization, intermediary, ecosystem?),
(b) how openness is measured (objective vs. subjective, inclusion of
dimensions), and (c) which users are reflecting upon openness.
Openness can be measured objectively and subjectively. Studies that
objectively measure openness typically analyze the impact of factual
platform changes to openness on market outcomes (cf. Boudreau, 2010;
Wessel, Thies, & Benlian, 2017), while subjective studies use survey
techniques to measure platform openness through the eyes of its users
in order to assess the impact of openness perceptions on user attitudes,
intentions and behaviors (Benlian et al., 2015). A first limitation is that
studies – from both streams – largely ignore the inclusion of customers
(for a notable exception, see Song, Baker, Wang, Choi, & Bhattacherjee,
2018). To account for the multiple users, it is important that future
research is not limited to the supply side, but also incorporates the
customer side. Second, most scholars agree on the multidimensionality
of platform openness (Benlian et al., 2015), yet, very few studies specify
subdimensions (access and authority) and identify the non-actor as-
pects. Future research should structurally identify and measure the
(sub)dimensions of platform openness for both actor- and nonfactor-
specific aspects. Third, extant research ignores the interrelationship
between objective platform changes and platform signature. Future
research should explore how users interpret objective platform di-
mensions to construct platform signatures, identifying whether they
make inferences per dimension, or make holistic evaluations. Studies in
the field of open innovation initiatives (e.g., open source software,
8 The business model literature also argues that business models become more
difficult to change over time, as companies invest and optimize business pro-
cesses, and because customers get attuned to the use of certain channels and
availability of product categories (Christensen, Bartman, & Van Bever, 2016).
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crowdsourcing) may provide useful insights into how objective changes
to the platform (related to access and authority) relate to the percep-
tions of suppliers (cf. Wessel et al., 2017), while studies in the field of
co-creation may help to understand how customers perceive and in-
terpret the authority dimension (Balka et al., 2014; Cui & Wu, 2016).
6.2. Identification of drivers and outcomes
Although many studies acknowledge that platforms make changes
to openness (Eisenmann, 2007; Gawer, 2009; Thomas et al., 2014;
West, 2003), few studies systematically identify the drivers of such
changes to platform openness. A starting point is to collect data from
various platforms from various industries to assess how industry (cus-
tomer, supplier, competitor, market and technology) and internal
characteristics (platform maturity, orientation, prior success) may drive
platform openness.
Similarly, although openness has been postulated to influence sev-
eral platform outcomes, including control (Boudreau, 2010), cost
sharing (Eisenmann et al., 2006), coordination issues (De Reuver et al.,
2015; Gawer & Cusumano, 2002), market growth (Boudreau, 2010),
innovation (Boudreau, 2012), ability to create and capture value
(Parker & Van Alstyne, 2017; West, 2003), few studies empirically test
the effect of openness on such outcomes.
An important reason for the limited number of studies studying the
drivers and outcomes lies in the dynamic nature of changes to platform
openness (temporal effects, path dependencies) that complicates the
establishment of cause-and-effect relationships. Most studies are
therefore restricted to quasi-experimental designs by linking platform
changes to its openness with longitudinal data on (performance) out-
comes. Empirical studies are limited to measuring intermediate per-
formance outcomes in terms of value creation like market growth or
innovation (Boudreau, 2010, 2012), but ignore the financial outcomes
like value appropriation and profitability. Furthermore, in relation to
the multidimensional nature, many scholars consider the impact of
openness at an aggregate level, but do not investigate how the dis-
tinctive subdimensions of access and authority may differentially im-
pact growth, value creation and value appropriation. In this respect,
Wan et al. (2017) have already suggested that subdimensions of the
same openness dimension may have opposite effects; for example,
supplier access may stimulate competition between the platform and its
suppliers, while supplier authority may stimulate collaboration. More
research is needed to empirically test the causal relationships between
the drivers and openness, and between openness and outcomes. Quasi-
experimental designs can provide initial insights and help to further
specify the nomological net surrounding platform openness.
6.3. Incorporation of interdependencies
Many studies point to the role of interdependencies and how they
may affect openness decisions and outcomes. Yet, few of these studies
make these interdependencies between dimensions and between actors
explicit, and even fewer test them empirically.
Regarding dimension interdependencies, future research should
measure the multiple dimensions simultaneously, and not limit the
analyses to individual dimensions, as this ignores the likely interplay
between dimensions and can potentially bias results.
Regarding actor interdependencies, it is important to understand
how decisions impact the distribution of benefits across actors to find
out how platforms can maintain high levels of cooperation among
multiple, self-interested contributors, who may have conflictive inter-
ests. When users perceive platforms to appropriate an unfair share of
benefits, suppliers and customers may circumvent the platform and
transact outside the platform, or suppliers may collectively create a new
competing platform (Wan et al., 2017). Organizational research on
umbrella organizations, in which a powerful network firm guides and
coordinates a network of independent firms operating under a uniform
entity (cf. Wincent, Thorgren, & Anokhin, 2014), may provide useful
insights into how to secure users' cooperation. Furthermore, to de-
termine how parties respond to platform decisions, psychological ex-
periments can assess users' fairness perceptions and (changed) usage
intentions in response to platform changes that favor focal users or the
other side.
6.4. Incorporation of platform dynamics
Existing studies often acknowledge but do not explicitly address the
dynamics of openness decisions. Yet, as such decisions are clearly in-
fluenced by previous decisions and have a temporal dimension, it is
important to address and incorporate feedback loops into future con-
ceptual models (Rahmandad & Sibdari, 2012).
For certain IT or mobile platforms, scholars can relatively easily
track openness decisions (e.g., changes in platform features, supplier
scope, product offerings, channel availability), and/or shifts in platform
goals (e.g., hiring of new CEOs), and link them to platform outcomes
(user participation, user satisfaction, market share). To measure and
analyze these dynamics, multivariate time-series econometric models
like, for example, Vector-Autoregressive (VAR) models (see e.g.
Leeflang, Wieringa, Bijmolt, & Pauwels, 2017) are useful, as they ex-
plicitly incorporate over-time dynamics and feedback effects. Such
models, however, are often demanding regarding data, the latter not
always (sufficiently) being available. In such circumstances, agent-
based models or simulation (games) can be a viable alternative to
generate the required data to mimic the platform dynamics and assess
the (dynamic) impact of openness' decisions on outcomes (Rahmandad
& Sibdari, 2012).
7. Conclusion
The concept of platform openness has recently received much
scholarly interest. This study is a first attempt to synthesize the existing
knowledge on drivers, dimensions and outcomes of digital platform
openness. Using a simple research framework, we take stock of the
existing findings that relate to the dimensions underlying a platform's
signature on openness. This overarching research framework may help
researchers and practitioners to understand under which circumstances
platforms are more likely to use an open or closed strategy, and predict
the consequences of making changes to the platform openness for the
platform and its users.
We identify three research challenges – interplay between dimen-
sions, interdependencies between actors, and platform dynamics – that
complicate the management of platform openness. Based on this, we
provide several avenues for future research to advance research and
address apparent research challenges. Although extant research has
made significant progress in defining openness, much work remains to
be done to understand the specific drivers and outcomes of openness, its
interdependencies and dynamics. We hope that our work, and our re-
search framework in particular, spurs researchers to advance openness
research to inform both theory and practice.
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